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Local Government Law
by James E. Elliott Jr.*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Because each and every tort occurs somewhere "in a county" and
frequently "within the city limits," local governments often find
themselves to be reluctant guests in the litigation resulting from such
events. Likewise, citizens and public sector employees seem less
hesitant to fight city hall than in days past. For these reasons (and
others), litigation involving municipalities, counties, and their related
entities enjoyed another banner year in Georgia, affording multiple
opportunities for the appellate courts to establish new rules of law in the
area or to reaffirm (and, occasionally, fine-tune) long-standing rules.
II.

SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY: RUMORS OF ITS DEMISE HAVE BEEN
GREATLY EXAGGERATED

During the survey period, claimants and their appellate counsel fought
fiercely to survive analysis of their cases under various nuances on the
theme of governmental immunity. Government actors and their
attorneys worked just as aggressively to define their actions as coming
within the protections of immunity, thus avoiding the risk of having
jurors determine the outcome of their cases. Overall, the common law
rule fared well.
"The doctrine of official immunity provides that although a public
officer or employee may be held personally liable for his negligent
ministerial acts, 'he may not be held liable for his discretionary acts
unless such acts are wilful [sic], wanton, or outside the scope of his authority.'"' Thus, determinative of whether official immunity will provide
* Of Counsel, Moore Law Firm, LLC, Warner Robins, Georgia; City Attorney, Warner
Robins, Georgia. Georgia Institute of Technology (B.A., 1979); Mercer University, Walter
F. George School of Law (J.D., 1982). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
1. Kennedy v. Mathis, 297 Ga. App. 295, 297, 676 S.E.2d 746, 748 (2009) (quoting
Gilbert v. Richardson, 264 Ga. 744, 752, 452 S.E.2d 476, 482 (1994)).
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a shield for the actions of a public actor is first whether the action was
ministerial or discretionary in nature.2 For the former, a cause of action
will lie for the negligent performance thereof, but for the latter, there is
generally protection unless the action is accompanied by malice or is
ultra vires on the part of the actor.3
In Kennedy v. Mathis," the road superintendent for Fannin County,
Georgia was required, in the scope of his employment, to follow an
unwritten county policy to have his employees mow vegetation along
county roadways from "ditch to ditch." Kennedy was injured when his
motorcycle collided with a vehicle that was backing out of a residence on
a county road. The vehicle driver contended that her view was partially
obstructed by vegetation growing along the roadway. Based upon this
contention, the government employee was invited to become a part of the
litigation.5
In its analysis of Mathis's role with the county government, the
Georgia Court of Appeals noted that Mathis supervised a crew of
approximately fifty employees and was charged with maintenance of the
county's rights-of-way, albeit with few, if any, written rules, regulations,
or policies.6 It was the responsibility of the department to mow the
roadways twice per year.7 There was apparently no further direction
from the governing authority of the county.8
The court acknowledged its duty to determine whether Mathis's
actions were ministerial or discretionary in nature and that the answer
to this question would be determinative of the claim. 9 The court
explained:
"A ministerial act is ... one that is simple, absolute, and definite,
arising under conditions admitted or proved to exist, and requiring
merely the execution of a specific duty. A discretionary act calls for the
exercise of personal deliberation and judgment, which in turn entails
examining the facts, reaching reasoned conclusions, and acting on them
in a way not specifically directed. Procedures or instructions adequate
to cause an act to become merely ministerial must be so clear, definite

2. See id. (citing Banks v. Happoldt, 271 Ga. App. 146, 149, 608 S.E.2d 741, 744
(2004)).
3. See id. (citing Banks, 271 Ga. App. at 149, 608 S.E.2d at 744).
4. 297 Ga. App. 295, 676 S.E.2d 746 (2009).
5. Id. at 296-97, 676 S.E.2d at 747.
6. Id. at 296, 676 S.E.2d at 747.
7. Id. at 297, 676 S.E.2d at 747.
8. See id. at 296-97, 676 S.E.2d at 747.
9. See id. at 297, 676 S.E.2d at 748.
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and certain as merely to require the execution of a relatively simple,
specific duty.""0
The court determined that Mathis should be afforded the protection of
immunity because of the broad discretion given him to accomplish the
semi-annual mowing of county road shoulders, including the plan for
doing so," the ability to determine what type of equipment to use, and
how best to use the resources given by the county.12 The court stated
that "[in the absence of any standards or guidelines dictating the
manner, method, and time limit for completing the task, Mathis
necessarily was vested with discretion."13
The court provided insight into factors it seemed to believe necessary
to find a duty ministerial in nature, primarily the existence of a policy
requiring specific actions under certain situations including time,
manner, or method of execution limitations.14 Because Fannin County
gave no such specific instructions to its roads department and superintendent, the court held that the grant of summary judgment to Mathis
was proper.15
An injured party in Todd v. Brooks1" believed he found a sufficiently
specific provision under section 4-3-4 of the Official Code of Georgia
Annotated (O.C.G.A.):" "It shall be the duty of the sheriff, his deputies, or any other county law enforcement officer to impound livestock
found to be running at large or straying.""
In Todd the plaintiff
asserted a claim against a sheriff's deputy who shot and killed a bull
found wandering near a public road.'"
Brooks, the deputy, was
dispatched to impound the animal, but when he and a passerby
attempted to corral the bull into a fenced area, "the bull turned and
began to advance toward Brooks with its head lowered, [and] Brooks
shot the bull in the head and killed it." 20
Holding that the statute in question did not provide a specific manner
in which a law enforcement officer must impound a stray animal with

10. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Banks, 271 Ga. App. at 149,608 S.E.2d at 744).
11. Mathis testified that his "crews would start 'at one end of the county and go all the
way through the county.'" Id., 676 S.E.2d at 747.
12. Id. at 298, 676 S.E.2d at 748.
13. Id. (citing Murray v. Ga. Dep't of Transp., 284 Ga. App. 263, 269, 644 S.E.2d 290,
296 (2007)).
14. See id. at 298-99, 676 S.E.2d at 748-49.
15. Id. at 299, 676 S.E.2d at 749.
16. 292 Ga. App. 329, 665 S.E.2d 11 (2008).
17. O.C.G.A. § 4-3-4 (1995).
18. Id. § 4-3-4(a); Todd, 292 Ga. App. at 331, 665 S.E.2d at 13.
19. 292 Ga. App. at 329, 665 S.E.2d at 12.
20. Id. at 329-30, 665 S.E.2d at 12.
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clear, definite, and certain procedures, and noting that the duty to
impound "was not simple or specific," the court of appeals held that the
duty imposed upon the government employee was discretionary and not
ministerial, thus affording immunity to the shooting sheriff.21 In its
analysis, the court reiterated a long-standing principle that immunity is
necessary "'to preserve the public employee's independence of action
without fear of lawsuits and to prevent a review of his or her judgment
in hindsight.'"2 2 It further recognized that the Georgia Supreme Court
had previously held that simply because an action is required by statute,
act that deprives the
it "is not necessarily 'the equivalent of a ministerial
23
actor of official immunity if done negligently.'"
As noted above, even a discretionary act, done with an improper
motive or by an unauthorized actor, may lead to liability for the
government. 24 However, to enable law enforcement officers to perform
their duties without the constant threat of lawsuits, it is well-established
that public policy considerations often weigh against the imposition of
liability for foreseeable harms.' A lawsuit was filed against an officer
in Selvy v. Morrison26 under the belief that the officer's action evi27
denced an appropriate circumstance to waive this protection.
Believing that the profane language used by the officer at the time of her
arrest' sufficiently showed actual malice or intent to cause injury,
Anita Selvy asserted her claim that immunity would not protect the
officer in a discretionary action (namely, making the decision to arrest
her), which would be protected but for the egregious behavior of the
officer.29
In upholding the grant of summary judgment to the officers, the court
of appeals noted that "[elven when an arresting officer operates on a
mistaken belief that an arrest is appropriate, official immunity still

21. Id. at 331, 665 S.E.2d at 13-14.
22. Id. at 330, 665 S.E.2d at 12-13 (quoting Cameron v. Lang, 274 Ga. 122, 123, 549
S.E.2d 341, 344 (2001)).
23. Id. at 331, 665 S.E.2d at 13 (quoting Murphy v. Bajjani, 282 Ga. 197, 199, 674
S.E.2d 54, 57 (2007)).
24. See supra text accompanying notes 1-3.
25. See Ansley v. Heinrich, 925 F.2d 1339, 1344 (11th Cir. 1991); 16A EUGENE
MCQUILLIN, MUNridiAL CORPORATIONS § 45.20 (3d ed. 2002 & Supp. 2008).
26. 292 Ga. App. 702, 665 S.E.2d 401 (2008).
27. Id. at 702, 665 S.E.2d at 403.
28. In deference to the dignity of the Author's Southern Baptist mother, the actual
language used during the arrest, quoted by the court in the opinion, is being omitted.
However, readers are urged to access the opinion to get the full flavor.
29. Selvy, 292 Ga. App. at 704, 665 S.E.2d at 404.
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applies."3 ° Moreover, it held that official immunity survives even when
an officer's actions may include slamming against a vehicle, making
threats, and using profanity.3 1 The court noted, "'[Elvidence demonstrating frustration, irritation, and possibly even anger is not sufficient
to penetrate official immunity.'"32 Having failed to show that Morrison
"deliberately intended to commit a wrongful act,"33 Selvy was unable
to pursue her claim. 34
The Georgia Supreme Court offered a different perspective in Georgia
Departmentof Transportationv. Heller.35 Heller's wife was killed when
the taxicab in which she was traveling spun out of control on a rain-slick
highway. Her suit against the City of Atlanta's vehicle-for-hire inspector
and other defendants was based upon the inspector giving the vehicle a
passing grade despite its tires having little or no tread. Allegedly, the
inspector's supervisor knew the inspector had improperly inspected tires,
and this constituted a nuisance.3"
Discerning the inspector's job duties, the supreme court determined
that the duty to inspect the condition of taxi tires was ministerial in
nature.3 ' Because of the inspector's
unauthorized and inadequate inspection that allowed the taxi in
question to be cleared for operation, and because [his] actions in this
regard violated ministerial duties, [the supreme court held] that the
Court of Appeals correctly concluded that [the inspector] was not
shielded from potential liability by the doctrine of official immunity.38
III.

ON THE ONE HAND, BEWARE THE RULES OF LAW; ON THE OTHER,
EMBRACE THEM

Even with a cause of action that can successfully be asserted against
a local government, its officers, or its employees, a claimant must be
cognizant of procedural rules that can determine the success or failure
of a claim. "'[Olur Constitution and law give great protection to counties

30. Id. at 706 n.17, 665 S.E.2d at 406 n.17 (quotation marks omitted) (quoting Reed v.
DeKalb County, 264 Ga. App. 83, 86, 589 S.E.2d 584, 587 (2003)).
31. Id. at 706, 665 S.E.2d at 406.
32. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Tittle v. Corso, 256 Ga. App. 859, 862, 569
S.E.2d 873, 877 (2002)).
33. Id.
34. Id. at 707, 665 S.E.2d at 406.
35. 285 Ga. 262, 674 S.E.2d 914 (2009).
36. Id. at 262, 674 S.E.2d at 916.
37. Id. at 267, 674 S.E.2d at 918.
38. Id. at 267-68, 674 S.E.2d at 919. Note to city and county attorneys: beware of job
descriptions.
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sometimes fail because of the

technical difficulties associated with prosecuting a claim against a
governmental entity.'"39
The purpose of ante litem notice requirements is to afford governments
the opportunity to resolve claims without the necessity and expense of
litigation, when appropriate.4' Such notices serve as a "mini" statute
of limitations, and the failure to timely and appropriately submit a
notice will result in the dismissal of a claim in its entirety.4 Enacted
many years ago,42 the ante litem notice requirement is still alive and
well.
The failure to submit a timely claim was fatal in Meadows v. Houston
County.48 In 1999 a property owner discovered county employees
performing drainage work on privately owned property. The work was
allegedly done for the purpose of addressing problems related to flooding
on an adjacent public right-of-way. When the owner demanded that the
county employees restore the property to its original condition, they left
the site instead. Complaints about the incident led to the execution of
an agreement between the county and the owner in 2001 for related
work to be performed by the county." A dispute arising out of the
agreement resulted in suit being filed against the county in 2006.45
The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's grant of summary
judgment for the defendants. 46 "It is undisputed that no written notice
was provided to the county of any claim in connection with any work
performed by its workers until August 2003. By this time, any action
either contesting or contrary to the terms of the settlement agreement
was barred."' 7
Conversely, the court of appeals held in Savage v. E.R. Snell
Contractor, Inc.48 that substantial compliance (rather than hypertechnical compliance) with the requirements of an ante litem notice

39. Watts v. City of Dillard, 294 Ga. App. 861,864, 670 S.E.2d 442, 444 (2008) (second
alteration in original) (quoting Scott v. City of Valdosta, 280 Ga. App. 481, 481,634 S.E.2d
472, 474 (2006)).
40. Williams v. Ga. Dep't of Human Res., 272 Ga. 624, 625,532 S.E.2d 401,403 (2000).
41. See id. at 625-26, 532 S.E.2d at 403.
42. GA. CODE § 479 (1863) (current version at O.C.GA § 36-11-1 (2006)); see Georgia
Tort Claims Act, 1992 Ga. Laws 1883, 1888-89 (codified as amended at O.C.GA § 50-21-26
(2009)).
43. 295 Ga. App. 183, 671 S.E.2d 225 (2008).
44. Id. at 183-84, 671 S.E.2d at 226-27.
45. Id. at 185-86, 671 S.E.2d at 227.
46. Id. at 186, 671 S.E.2d at 227, 228.
47. Id., 671 S.E.2d at 228.
48. 295 Ga. App. 319, 672 S.E.2d 1 (2008).
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statute is sufficient.49 In Savage a property owner alleged that a 2004
or 2005 road-widening project caused flooding in her yard, house, and
septic system. An ante litem notice asserting claims for damage was
submitted to the State on July 25, 2006. Urging that the owner was
aware of potential claims prior to July 25, 2005, the State moved at the
trial court for dismissal of all claims because of the alleged untimeliness
of the statutory notice."e The alleged failure of the notice to contain the
specific dates on which flooding had occurred was also asserted as a
defense under the notice requirement. 6
Upholding the trial court's finding that claims for damage prior to July
25, 2005, were time barred-but that all others could proceed-the court
of appeals held that an ongoing nuisance had occurred on the property
and "a new cause of action arose with each loss. "52 As such, the notice
was timely for all damage occurring after the twelve months preceding
the date of the notice to the State.53 In addition, the plaintiffs
did not know the precise times of the reportedly nearly constant
flooding events at the property. Given the contents of their notice, the
continuing nature of their claims, and their inability to recall the
specific times of the flooding incidents, [the court] conclude[d] that the
[plaintiffs] complied with the plain language of the ante litem notice
provisions.5
IV.

LEGISLATVE CONFLICTS, OR A LACK THEREOF

Confusion over statutory language was the issue in Concerned Citizens
of Willacoochee v. City of Willacoochee.55 Conflicts between the 1953
city charter and a 1980 charter amendment led to litigation over the
method for filling vacancies on the city's governing authority.5" The
1953 charter provided that vacancies could be "filled by appointment and
selected by the mayor and aldermen."57 The 1980 charter amendment

49. See id. at 325-26, 672 S.E.2d at 7.
50. Id. at 320, 672 S.E.2d at 3. Notice of a claim against the State or one of its
agencies is required under O.C.G.A. § 50-21-26 (2009) "within [twelve] months of the date
the loss was discovered or should have been discovered." O.C.G.A. § 50-21-26(a)(1).
51. Savage, 295 Ga. App. at 322, 672 S.E.2d at 5.
52. Id. at 324-25, 672 S.E.2d at 5-6.
53. See id.
54. Id. at 326, 672 S.E.2d at 7.
55. 285 Ga. 625, 680 S.E.2d 846 (2009). Local government attorneys will readily admit
that they become "concerned" when a "concerned citizens" group is created.
56. Id. at 625, 680 S.E.2d at 846.
57. Willacoochee Charter, 1953 Ga. Laws 3039, 3051, quoted in Concerned Citizens of
Willacoochee, 285 Ga. at 625, 680 S.E.2d at 847.
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provided that, in the case of a vacancy, "the mayor and council have the
power to call a special election ordered by the city council."8 The
dispute arose when the elected officials chose to fill a vacancy with an
appointment and declined requests to call a special election.59 The
supreme court held that the two charter provisions were not in direct
conflict and could be read in harmony to provide alternate methods of
filling vacancies."
The court held that a writ of mandamus was
inappropriate and that the trial court correctly declined to issue a writ
calling for a special election. 1
In Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp. v. City of Atlanta, 2 the
supreme court held that the City of Atlanta navigated the statutory
strait of O.C.G.A. § 36-60-1763 with some success." Following the
1993 court of appeals decision in Druid Associates, Ltd. v. National
Income Realty TRust," which upheld the survival of liens for unpaid
water, sewer, and other utility charges after foreclosure," the General

58. City of Willacoochee Charter Amended, 1980 Ga. Laws 3941, 3942 (emphasis
added), quoted in Concerned Citizens of Willacoochee, 285 Ga. at 626, 680 S.E.2d at 847.
59. Concerned Citizens of Willacoochee, 285 Ga. at 625, 680 S.E.2d at 847.
60. Id. at 626, 680 S.E.2d at 847.
61. Id. at 627, 680 S.E.2d at 848.
62. 285 Ga. 189, 674 S.E.2d 905 (2009).
63. O.C.G.A. § 36-60-17 (2006). The complete statute provides as follows:
(a) No public or private water supplier shall refuse to supply water to any single
or multifamily residential property to which water has been furnished through the
use of a separate water meter for each residential unit on application of the owner
or new resident tenant of the premises because of the indebtedness of a prior
owner, prior occupant, or prior lessee to the water supplier for water previously
furnished to such premises.
(b) For each new or current account to supply water to any premises or
property, the public or private water supplier shall maintain a record of
identifying information on the user of the water service and shall seek reimbursement of unpaid charges for water service furnished initially from the person who
incurred the charges.
(c) A public or private water supplier shall not impose a lien against real
property to secure unpaid charges for water furnished unless the owner of such
real property is the person who incurred the charges.
(d) A public or private supplier of gas, sewerage service, or electricity shall not
impose a lien against real property to secure unpaid charges for gas, sewerage
service, or electricity unless the owner of such real property is the person who
incurred the charges.
Id. § 36-60-17(a)-(d).
64. See FederalHome Loan, 285 Ga. at 193-94, 674 S.E.2d at 909.
65. 210 Ga. App. 684, 436 S.E.2d 721 (1993).
66. Id. at 686, 436 S.E.2d at 723.
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Assembly adopted the statute in question67 to invalidate the decision.' s
At issue in Federal Home Loan was the validity of an Atlanta
ordinance creating a lien for unpaid utilities incurred by a property
owner.69 The ordinance provides that "[slubject to O.C.G.A. § 36-60-17,
the delinquent bill or charge shall be a lien on the property where the
bill or charge was incurred."0 Federal Home Loan acquired through
foreclosure a property to which the city attached a lien of $11,117.90 for
unpaid water charges incurred by the previous owner. Contending that
the city ordinance was preempted by the state statute, Federal Home
Loan brought an action in United States District Court for the Northern
District of Georgia seeking declaratory and injunctive relief.7 1
In responding to questions certified to it by the federal court, the
Georgia Supreme Court held that the city ordinance properly created a
"heightened-status" lien because the charges in question were incurred
by an owner.72 The ordinance, however, did not authorize the city to
refuse service for unpaid charges by a previous owner; refusal of service
is prohibited by state law.73 By specific reference in its ordinance to
the state statute, the city was allowed to create a lien that survived
foreclosure.74
V.

GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES Do NOT FARE WELL AS PLAINTIFFS

While government employees were often protected from liability by the
courts during the survey period when asserting claims against the
government, their success was a mixed bag. In DeKalb County v.
Bull,7 5 a terminated law enforcement officer sought reinstatement
through the process of certiorari. Evan Bull was terminated by his
employer for use of excessive force and appealed that decision to a
county hearing officer, who upheld the decision. After filing a petition
for writ of certiorari to the superior court, Bull was afforded a bench
trial. Evidence submitted to the superior court included events that
occurred after his case was heard by the county's hearing officer,

67. 1994 Ga. Laws 1957, 1958-59.
68. See FederalHome Loan, 285 Ga. at 192-93, 674 S.E.2d at 908.

69. Id. at 189, 674 S.E.2d at 906.
70. ATLANTA, GA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 154-120(1) (Municode through Aug. 25,
2009).

71.
72.

FederalHome Loan, 285 Ga. at 189-90, 674 S.E.2d at 906.
Id. at 193-94, 674 S.E.2d at 908-09.

73.

Id.

74. See id.
75. 295 Ga. App. 551, 672 S.E.2d 500 (2009).
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including information that he had, after his termination, been acquitted
of criminal charges related to the incident in question.76
Overturning the superior court's order to reinstate Bull with back pay,
the court of appeals reiterated the "any evidence" rule in certiorari-the
statutory requirement that a decision be upheld if there is substantial
evidence in the record from below.7 This rule has been interpreted by
the Georgia appellate courts to require simply that any evidence in
support of the decision below mandates that the decision be affirmed.' s
Similarly, in Glass v. City of Atlanta, 9 an officer with the Atlanta
Police Department was unsuccessful in having his termination reversed.80 Glass was terminated and asserted his right to appeal the
termination. The city's civil service board upheld the termination, albeit
nearly three years later. Glass's certiorari petition, due to a series of
missteps, was not reviewed by the superior court for nearly twelve years,
when it was dismissed.8 1
Again reviewing the evidence required in a petition for writ of
certiorari, the court of appeals noted that "'[elven evidence which barely
meets the any evidence standard is sufficient, and the presence of
conflicting evidence nonetheless meets that standard.'" 2
More
interesting, perhaps, was this statement by the court:
Although we ultimately affirm the decisions of the Board and the
superior court, we would be remiss in our responsibilities as an

appellate court if we failed to express our disapproval with the manner
in which this matter was handled by both the Board and the superior
court once appellant petitioned for writ of certiorari. The right to
petition for writ of certiorari so that the superior court can review a
decision of the Civil Service Board necessarily includes the requirement
that such a petition be reasonably heard.'
The issue of incorrect advice on pension matters arose in Mullis v.
Bibb County.'
Richard Mullis contended that he was given bad
information on his county retirement benefits, alleging that he was told
by the human resources office that his benefits would begin earlier than
76. Id. at 551-52, 672 S.E.2d at 501.
77. Id. at 552 & n.2, 672 S.E.2d at 501 & n.2 (citing O.C.GA. § 5-4-12(b) (1995)).
78. See id.
79. 293 Ga. App. 11, 666 S.E.2d 406 (2008).
80. Id. at 11-12, 666 S.E.2d at 407.
81. Id. at 13, 666 S.E.2d at 408.
82. Id. at 14, 666 S.E.2d at 409 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Dep't of
Cmty. Health v. Pruitt Corp., 284 Ga. App. 888, 890, 645 S.E.2d 13, 15 (2007), rev'd, 284
Ga. 158, 664 S.E.2d 233 (2008)).
83. Id. at 18, 666 S.E.2d at 411.
84. 294 Ga. App. 721, 669 S.E.2d 716 (2008).
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the date provided by the county's plan." Mullis challenged the county's
later correction of the error on the basis of promissory estoppel," but
under the litany of case law interpreting O.C.G.A. § 45-6-5,7 he was
unsuccessful.' When the plan administrator erroneously told Mullis
that his pension benefits would begin on a date prior to the correct date,
she exceeded her authority s9
And finally, an unpaid position on the Meriwether County Industrial
Development Authority was the subject of the dispute in Murphy v.
Pearson.' In October 2005 Karey Murphy was appointed to fill the
remainder of a term on the county authority under the mistaken belief
that the term to which she had been appointed expired in January 2006.
In fact, the term expired in January 2007. But the county board of
commissioners appointed Murphy to a four-year term in January 2006.
A new county board of commissioners appointed Arthur Pearson to serve
the correct four-year term in January 2007. Murphy challenged
Pearson's appointment and later appealed the trial court's determination
that Pearson lawfully held the seat.91
Invoking the common law rule against binding subsequent administrations, the Georgia Supreme Court held that the county board was
without power in 2006 to appoint Murphy to a term beginning in 2007,
which was beyond the term of office for the incumbent commissioners.9
"[Tihe appointing authority may make a prospective appointment so long
as the vacancy to be filled by the prospective appointment will exist at
a time when the appointing authority is still in office."93 Because two
of the terms of office for the county commissioners in power in January
2006 were set to expire before January 2007, 4 those commissioners
95
could not appoint Murphy to the authority prospectively.

85. Id. at 721, 669 S.E.2d at 717.
86. Id. at 725, 669 S.E.2d at 719.
87. O.C.G.A. § 45-6-5 (2002) (stating that "[tihe public may not be estopped by the acts
of any officer done in the exercise of an unconferred power").
88. Mullis, 294 Ga. App. at 725, 669 S.E.2d at 720.
89. Id.
90. 284 Ga. 296, 667 S.E.2d 83 (2008).
91. Id. at 296-97, 667 S.E.2d at 84-85.
92. Id. at 297-98, 667 S.E.2d at 85.
93. Id. at 297, 667 S.E.2d at 85.
94. Interestingly, the board consisted of five members, and thus, less than a majority
of the commissioners were replaced in 2006. See Meriwether County Georgia: Commissioners Section, http'/www.meriwethercountyga.org/commissioners/ (last visited Oct. 21, 2009).
Therefore, a majority of the commissioners that appointed Murphy in 2006 were still
sitting on the board in 2007.
95. Murphy, 284 Ga. at 297-98, 667 S.E.2d at 85.

